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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW-The Sexual
Harassment Claim Quandary: Workers' Compensation as
an Inadequate and
Unavailable Remedy: Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge,' the New Mexico Court of
Appeals confronted for the first time the issue of whether sexual ha-
rassment injuries are compensable under workers' compensation law.
Although not permitting recovery in this case, the court recognized that
injuries sustained due to on-the-job sexual harassment could be com-
pensable. However, the Court strongly suggested that the policy behind
workers' compensation laws does not provide an adequate remedy for
sexually harassed workers, and that claims for such injuries are better
pursued under other causes of action, such as statutory remedies or
common law tort actions. 2
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Guadalupe P. Cox, while employed by Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge,
complained of several instances of sexually harassing behavior towards
her by two co-employees and one supervisor between October 1988 and
October 1990. 3 The first two incidents involved the sexual advances of
co-employee Patrick Feeley, who tried to hug and kiss Cox and made
repeated requests to take her to bed. Cox reported these incidents to her
immediate supervisor, who confronted Feeley shortly thereafter and threat-
ened him with discharge if such behavior continued. Feeley's improper
behavior was not repeated.4
A second incident occurred in June 1989 when Cox, while with several
other co-employees at the worksite, heard a fellow employee ask whether
another employee had "got [sic] his job because he sucked cock." 5 Cox
reported the incident to her employer's Industrial Relations Office.
Cox began to see a psychiatrist in August 1989. She complained of
emotional and mental injuries6 allegedly due to the incidents of sexual
harassment. The psychiatrist recommended that Cox take some time off
work, and she then took several periods of time off in the ensuing year.
In August 1990 Cox filed a claim for workers' compensation, alleging
1. 115 N.M. 335, 850 P.2d 1038 (Ct. App. 1993).
2. Id. at 338-39, 850 P.2d at 1041.42.
3. The incident involving the supervisor was not reported in the case.
4. Cox, 115 N.M. at 336, 850 P.2d at 1039.
5. Id.
6. Cox complained of crying spells, feelings of despair, anxiety, gastric pain, depression,
sleeplessness, and lack of energy. Id.
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psychological and physical injuries resulting from sexual harassment at
the workplace. She sought medical and disability benefits.
During this entire period, Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge had a detailed
written policy prohibiting sexual harassment in the work environment.
The policy prohibited both physical and verbal sexually harassing behavior,
whether committed by supervisory or non-supervisory personnel. This
behavior would include "offensive flirtation, advances, propositions,...
sexually degrading words to describe an individual .... [or] telling of
offensive jokes." 7
The Workers' Compensation Judge denied the claim, concluding that
Cox's injuries did not "arise out of employment," as required by the
Workers' Compensation Act,' and that sexual harassment was not a
permitted practice in the employer's worksite and indeed was contrary
to the employer's worksite environment. 9 Cox appealed the decision.
After ruling that Cox's injuries did not arise out of employment, the
court of appeals discussed in dicta whether New Mexico's Workers'
Compensation Act provided an adequate remedy for the type of injuries
typically incurred by victims of sexual harassment, and whether other
statutes or common law tort actions provided relief that more adequately
furthered public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace.' 0 The
court's answer to this question sends a strong message to future sexual
harassment litigants in New Mexico about how to best pursue legal relief
for such injuries.
III. A HISTORY OF THE ISSUES
In order for a claim to be compensable under the New Mexico Workers'
Compensation Act, the injury must "arise out of employment" and "in
the course" of the employment." An injury is said to arise in the course
of employment when it takes place within the period of the employment,
at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he or she
is fulfilling job duties or engaged in doing something incidental to the
job. 2 Cox clearly met these criteria." The only issue was whether the
injuries arose out of the employment. 4
7. Cox, 115 N.M. at 336, 850 P.2d at 1039.
8. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (Cum. Supp. 1993). Psychological disabilities arising out
of employment are covered by workers' compensation only if the impairment was caused by a single
psychologically traumatic event unrelated to the usual stresses of employment or if the mental illness
results from a work-related physical impairment. Douglass v. State, 112 N.M. 183, 186, 812 P.2d
1331, 1334 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575 (1991).
9. Cox, 115 N.M. at 336-37, 850 P.2d at 1039-40.
10. The court stated "that the way to maintain public policies against sexual harassment on the
job is to pursue the common-law or statutory remedies available to promote these policies and not
to engraft those policies on to a very different legislative scheme such as the Workers' Compensation
Act." Cox, 115 N.M. at 338-39, 850 P.2d at 1041-42.
11. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1993); see also Martinez v. Fidel, 61 N.M. 6, 9,
293 P.2d 654, 657 (1956).
12. Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Servs. Dept., 89 N.M. 60, 63, 547 P.2d 65, 68
(1976).
13. Cox's injuries all occurred during the time she was employed at the employer's worksite,
and while she was performing duties incidental to the job.
14. Cox, 115 N.M. at 336, 850 P.2d at 1039.
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The New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act provides that employers
"shall become liable to and shall pay to any such worker injured by
accident arising out of ... his employment ...."15 In other words, "the
accident causing the injury must result from a risk reasonably incident
to the employment; a risk common to the public generally and not
increased in any way by the circumstances of the employment is not
covered by the act . ... ,"6 In other words, there must be some kind
of causal connection between the employment and the accident.
7
A. "Arising Out Of" Employment
The probability or improbability of an accident, however, is not con-
clusive in determining whether recovery is allowed under workers' com-
pensation.18 The appropriate inquiry is whether the conditions of the
workplace environment foreseeably led to the injury-causing accident.
Hence, if a particular incident occurs for the first time at a worksite,
an injured worker is not precluded from recovery if the accident is
"incidental" to the employment, i.e., if under the particular circumstances
it was foreseeable that the employment contributed to the risk or ag-
gravated the injuries. 19
Many sexual harassment/discrimination claims involve accidents which
initially cause mental or emotional harm, and which later lead to physically
manifested injuries.20 It is unclear, however, if such claims are compensable
in New Mexico if the accident causes only mental harm. Under New
Mexico law prior to the 1987 amendments to the Workers' Compensation
Act, a claim alleging that work-related stress led to a psychological
disability was held compensable. 2' However, after Candelaria, the New
Mexico Legislature rewrote several definitions sections of the Workers'
Compensation Act.22 These changes had the effect of allowing recovery
15. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-2 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
16. Gilbert v. E.B. Law & Son, Inc., 60 N.M. 101, 107, 287 P.2d 992, 996 (1955).
17. Berry v. J.C. Penney Co., 74 N.M. 484, 485, 394 P.2d 996, 997 (1964).
18. See Ortiz v. Ortiz & Torres Dri-Wall Co., 83 N.M. 452, 493 P.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1972)
(plaintiff who suffered back injury while installing sheet rock and could not pinpoint cause of
injury was compensated).
19. Berry, 74 N.M. at 486, 394 P.2d at 998.
20. See, e.g., Accardi v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Hill v.
John Chezik Imports, 797 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. App. 1990); Phifer v. Herbert, 115 N.M. 135, 848
P.2d 5 (Ct. App. 1993); Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, 815 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. App.
1991).
21. Candelaria v. General Elec. Co., 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470 (Ct. App. 1986). The plaintiff's
job consisted of preparing components of jet engines for plating. After cleansing, the parts were
placed in a plating bath for a period of time, after which a timer would go off to indicate that
the part was ready to be removed. The plaintiff was gradually assigned more and more job duties,
including those of a former co-worker who was not replaced. These additional duties complicated
the plaintiff's original job of retrieving parts after the timer went off. The foreman made exacting
demands on the plaintiff and often made plaintiff drop everything to work on the priority items.
Plaintiff's complaints to the foreman, the labor union, and other plant officials were not acted on.
The plaintiff, after contemplating the murder of his foreman, went home and was found crying
and shaking by his wife. He suffered a nervous breakdown and required several hospitalizations.
22. The amendment redefined "accidental injury," "impairment," "total disability," and "partial
disability." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-19 & -24 to -26 (Repl. Pamp. 1987). See Douglass v. State,
112 N.M. 183, 186, 812 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575
(1991).
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for mental impairment only if (1) the impairment was caused by a single
psychologically traumatic event unrelated to the usual stresses of em-
ployment, or (2) the mental illness resulted from a work-related physical
impairment. 23 Cox did not address whether a mental injury sustained as
a result of sexual harassment fits under either of these exceptions. Hence,
it is unclear whether mental injuries caused by sexual harassment are
compensable.
B. Public Policy Underlying the Workers' Compensation Act
The Workers' Compensation Act is primarily intended to offset the
lost wages of a worker injured by a work-related accident, thereby
promoting the policy that such workers will not become dependent on
state welfare programs.2 The Act is primarily intended to keep a worker
and his or her "family at least minimally secure financially.'' 25 The Act
is, in effect, a broadly-based, state-run insurance program, with employers
paying premiums and injured workers collecting an amount set by statute.
In order to effectuate these policies, should an accident occur during
the course of employment and arise out of employment, the exclusive
remedy for such accident victims is the Act, to the exclusion of all other
possible remedies. 26 Thus, a statutorily-imposed compromise is established
between an injured worker and the employer. First, the employee whose
injury meets the requirements of a workers' compensation claim is barred
from pursuing any other statutory or common law cause of action; should
the injury result in death, the surviving spouse, personal representative,
or next of kin is also bound by the exclusivity of the Act.27 In situations
where the employer's conduct is clearly negligent or intentionally tortious,
the result is that the claimant receives a substantially smaller monetary
amount than would likely have been recovered in a common law tort
claim. In return, the employer surrenders the common law defenses of
assumption of risk, the "fellow servant" rule, and contributory negli-
gence. 28 Therefore, it can be said that workers' compensation and tort
law are incompatible remedies .29
This conflict invites the question of whether workers' compensation
statutes preclude separate actions for sexual harassment injuries incurred
at the workplace. Two states have decided that it does not.30 At least
23. Id.
24. See Casias v. Zia Co., 93 N.M. 78, 80, 596 P.2d 521, 523 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93
N.M. 8, 595 P.2d 1203 (1979) (citing Codling v. Aztec Well Serv. Co., 89 N.M. 213, 549 P.2d
628 (Ct. App. 1976)).
25. Aranda v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 93 N.M. 412, 416, 600 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 93 N.M. 683, 604 P.2d 821 (1979).
26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(D) (Cure. Supp. 1993).
27. Id.
28. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-8 (Cum. Supp. 1993).
29. Romero v. J.W. Jones Constr. Co., 98 N.M. 658, 661, 651 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Ct. App.
1982).
30. See Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991) (workers' compensation statute
does not provide exclusive remedy for workplace sexual harassment claims); Byrd v. Richardson-
Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1989) (public policy requires that exclusivity provision
of workers' compensation does not shield employee from tort liability for sexual harassment).
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one jurisdiction has barred actions separate from workers' compensation.3'
Although Cox did not address this issue, it appears that in New Mexico,
a claimant may be prevented from pursuing a remedy outside of workers'
compensation law for injuries resulting from sexual harassment if the
court rules that the injuries arose out of and in the course of the
employment. 32 However, should the injury not meet the requirements of
a workers' compensation claim, a claimant is not precluded from pursuing
another remedy, such as a Title VII claim.
33
IV. ANALYSIS OF POLICY EMPLOYED TO REACH DECISION
In attempting to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries
resulting from sexual harassment, Cox is a case of first impression in
New Mexico. However, the court relied on previous workers' compensation
cases to determine the chief question of whether the injury arises out
of employment. The vast majority of these previous cases involved a
worker sustaining a physical injury of some sort.3 Nonetheless, whether
physical or non-physical, the injury must arise out of employment. That
is, "the disability must have resulted from a 'risk incident to [the] work
itself' or 'increased by the circumstances of the employment." ' 3
The first inquiry in determining whether an injury arises out of em-
ployment is whether the disability "resulted from a 'risk incident to [the]
work itself." ' '36 For most types of employment, this argument is unlikely
to be the basis of a successful sexual harassment claim. First, it is difficult
to consider sexual harassment actions incident to the work of most
occupations or employment positions. There is no logical nexus between
sexual harassment and the job description or job duties of most occu-
pations. 37 However, there may be exceptions. For example, a cocktail
31. Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992) (exclusivity
of Illinois workers' compensation statute preempts tort claim resulting from sexual harassment by
co-employee).
32. See Arnold v. State, 94 N.M. 278, 609 P.2d 725 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674,
615 P.2d 991 (1980) (injuries to plaintiff who lived in employer-provided housing and was raped
and assaulted by a mentally retarded student in her residence held to arise out of and in course
of employment, thus invoking exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation statute and precluding
plaintiff's tort claim).
33. Following the denial of Cox's claim for workers' compensation benefits for sexual harassment
injuries, she filed a Title VII action. After her Title VII claim was denied on the merits by the
Federal District Court in New Mexico, Cox v. Chino Mines, No. 91-0590 (D.N.M. 1992), the case
was argued before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Cox v. Phelps Dodge, No. 92-2214 (10th
Cir. Nov. 9, 1993). See also Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, 815 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tenn.
App. 1991) (exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation law do not preclude a Title VII
action).
34. But see Douglass v. State, 112 N.M. 183, 812 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M.
77, 811 P.2d 575 (1991) (worker can be compensated for mental impairment caused by work-related
conditions).
35. Candelaria, 105 N.M. at 173, 730 P.2d at 476 (citing Kern v. Ideal Basic Indus., 101 N.M.
801, 802, 689 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1984)).
36. Cox, 115 N.M. at 337, 850 P.2d at 1040; see also supra notes 19-24 and accompanying
text.
37. See Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, 815 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. App. 1991) (holding
that acts constituting sexual harassment were never meant to fall under workers' compensation).
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waitress required to wear revealing attire, or a stripper, could viably
claim that sexual harassment is incident to her employment. Nonetheless,
in most cases, the "incidency" factor is only remotely relevant, if at all,
to a workers' compensation claim based on sexual harassment.
Cox cited Arnold v. State" to illustrate when a job or job environment
can create or enhance the risk of a sexual assault.3 9 In Arnold, an
employee who was living in employer-provided housing at a state facility
was assaulted and raped in her residence by a mentally retarded student.40
Although the employee was not required to live at employer's premises,
the court found that, given the remoteness of the facility, the plaintiff
had no other viable choice.4' Additionally, the employee was required to
assist in nonemployment-related duties such as fighting fires on the
premises in her off-hours. Thus, the court found that the injuries arose
out of her employment. 42 Unfortunately, Arnold is not very helpful in
analyzing the decision in Cox. The decision in Arnold rested almost
completely on the "bunkhouse" rule, 43 whereby injuries incurred during
an employee's off-hours arise out of employment if the employee is
required or has little alternative but to live on the employer's premises.
As in the majority of employment-related sexual harassment cases, Cox
did not involve an employee living on employer-provided housing.
The second inquiry for determining whether the injury arises out of
employment is whether the likelihood of injury is "increased by the
circumstances of the employment."" According to the court in Cox, this
inquiry considers the frequency of incidents involving sexual harassment
in the particular workplace, including those not involving the claimant.
In Cox the claimant testified that she was unaware of any other sexually
harassed employees at the workplace. 4 In fact, the claimant stated that
in the nine previous years of employment at this workplace, she had not
experienced any sexual harassment. 46 Thus, the court concluded that
"sexual harassment was not a peculiar risk at this workplace. ' 47
The court referred to the "horseplay" cases to demonstrate when an
accident becomes a regular incident of employment. 48 In Woods v. As-
plundh Tree Expert Co., 49 a worker broke his leg after he and a co-
worker engaged in wrestling during the course of employment. 0 The
court held that horseplay injuries are compensable under workers' com-
pensation only if the employer had "actual or constructive notice" of
38. 94 N.M. 278, 609 P.2d 725 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980).
39. Cox, 115 N.M. at 338, 850 P.2d at 1041.
40. Arnold, 94 N.M. at 279, 609 P.2d at 726.
41. Id. at 279-80, 609 P.2d at 726-27.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 279, 609 P.2d at 726.
44. Cox, 115 N.M. at 337, 850 P.2d at 1040.
45. Id. at 338, 850 P.2d at 1041.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 114 N.M. 162, 836 P.2d 81 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 744, 832 P.2d 1223 (1992).
50. Id. at 163, 836 P.2d at 82.
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such accidents or the employer had "reason to foresee" the accident."
Because wrestling was an unusual activity which the employer discouraged,
the horseplay was not a regular incident, and consequently did not arise
out of the claimant's employment.52 Although the court in Cox acknowl-
edged that rules concerning horseplay should not be "superimposed onto
sexual harassment situations," 53 the court did exactly that by stating that
the infrequency of sexual harassment at the employer's worksite and the
employer's written policy prohibiting sexual harassment were sufficient
to deny the workers' compensation claim.
54
In considering whether the circumstances of the employment are likely
to increase the chance of injury, the court also found significant that
the employer had specific written policies, "known to all employees,"
that banned sexual harassment in the workplace. 5 Thus, the defendant
"neither authorized nor tolerated the sexual harassment incidents. ' 56 In
fact, the defendant, through the immediate supervisor, reprimanded and
threatened the offending employee with termination if he did not im-
mediately stop the offensive behavior.57 Thus, the demonstrated prohi-
bition of sexual harassment negated any argument that the plaintiff's
injury arose out of her employment.
The decision in Cox, however, left open the question of whether sexual
harassment injuries are compensable under workers' compensation law
as "incident to the employment" when an employer ignores or tolerates
the offensive behavior. Similarly, a claimant who can show that the
employer engaged in negligent hiring practices, such as hiring a known
sex offender or a person with a history of sexually harassing behavior,
could establish the nexus between the employer and the offensive act.59
The final reason the court gave for denying Cox's claim is that the
Workers' Compensation Act is ill-suited for promoting the social policy
against sexual harassment on the job. 60 Although not explicitly mentioned
by the court, several distinctions exist between injuries traditionally held
compensable under workers' compensation and those resulting from work-
51. Id. at 162.
52. Id. at 166-67, 836 P.2d at 85-86.
53. Cox, 115 N.M. at 338, 850 P.2d at 1041.
54. Id. The court also discussed the "course of employment test" for horseplay cases. As
previously mentioned, this query is irrelevant to the central issue in Cox (what circumstances are
needed to meet the "arising out of employment" requirement in cases of sexual harassment).
55. Id. at 336, 850 P.2d at 1039.
56. Id. at 338, 850 P.2d at 1041.
57. Id. at 336, 850 P.2d at 1039.
58. See, e.g., Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987) (tort case where employer was
liable for failing to investigate injured employee's complaint of sexual harassment by employee's
supervisor).
59. See, e.g., Hollrah v. Freidrich, 634 S.W.2d 221 (Mo. App. 1982) (tort case where employer,
in exercise of reasonable care, should have known of offending employee's reputation for sexually
harassing behavior). But see Murphy v. ARA Serv., Inc., 298 S.E.2d 528 (Ga. App. 1982) (plaintiff
denied workers' compensation because wilful act by third person with a history of sexual harassing
behavior was not work-related, therefore failing to meet the "arising out of employment" re-
quirement).
60. Cox, 115 N.M. at 338-39, 850 P.2d at 1041-42.
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related sexual harassment. The primary basis for workers' compensation
is to provide some relief to injured workers for lost pay and to alleviate
burdens on the welfare system .6  Sexual harassment constitutes an injury
to personal rights rather than an economic injury.62 "While workplace
injuries rob a person of resources, sexual harassment robs the person of
dignity and self esteem.' '63 Another important distinction is that sexual
harassment is a behavior rather than an "accident."" Hence, it can more
readily be regulated by an employer than can a non-foreseeable job
accident. Finally, it should be kept in mind that sexual harassment
constitutes an outrageous affront to a fundamental principle, 65 namely
that a person is not to be treated inequitably on the basis of physical
characteristics. The remedies prescribed by the Workers' Compensation
Act, which are corrective in nature and result in modest awards, are
inadequate to help further policy which aims at eradicating sexual ha-
rassment.
V. THE PITFALLS OF NON-WORKERS' COMPENSATION
REMEDIES FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
The court adopted the employer's argument that in order to further
policies against sexual harassment, a claim for sexual harassment injuries
would be better pursued under either the New Mexico Human Rights
Act," the Civil Rights Act of 1964,67 or common law tort remedies.6
This conclusion, although having merit, fails to consider that these non-
workers' compensation actions are full of legal obstacles 9 for potential
claimants and, consequently, will often provide inadequate relief for sexual
harassment victims.
The most obviously inadequate of these remedies is the New Mexico
Human Rights Act.70 In the context of pursuing a sexual harassment
claim, the HRA offers little more than meager relief. It provides for a
grievance procedure and injunctive relief if "an employer . . . discrim-
61. See Casias v. Zia Co., 93 N.M. 78, 596 P.2d 521 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 8, 595
P.2d 1203 (1979).
62. Id.
63. Harman v. Moore's Quality Snack Foods, 815 S.W.2d 519, 527 (Tenn. App. 1991).
64. An accident is required to permit workers' compensation recovery. See Aranbula v. Banner
Mining Co., 49 N.M. 253, 161 P.2d 867 (1945).
65. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (equal rights under the law for all persons within jurisdiction
of the United States).
66. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -7, 28-1-9 to -14 (Repl. Pamp. 1991) [hereinafter "HRA"].
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
68. Cox, 115 N.M. at 338-39, 850 P.2d at 1041-42.
69. These would include inadequate compensation, difficult burdens of making a prima facie
case, and meeting arduous statutory requirements. See, e.g., Accardi v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.
App. 4th 341 (Cal. App. 1993) (under California law, prior to bringing a sexual harassment action,
a sexual discrimination claimant must first file a claim with the Department of Fair Employment
and Housing within one year of the date of the alleged act); see also Peter G. Nash & Jonathan
R. Mook, Employee Tort Actions for Sexual Harassment in Virginia: Negotiating the Liability Mine
Field, 1:2 Civ. RIGHTS J. 247 (1990); Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461 (1986).
70. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-1 to -7, 28-1-9 to -14 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
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inate[s] in matters of ... conditions ... of employment against any
person otherwise qualified because of... sex ... ,,71 An aggrieved party
who initiates a grievance procedure under the HRA must have exhausted
all administrative remedies before filing suit under the HRA. 72 As for
compensatory relief, the Human Rights Commission "may" require the
employer to pay actual damages and attorney's fees to the employee.
73
Hence, with the exception of a possible award of backpay and attorney's
fees, a sexual harassment claimant under the HRA will not recover proper
compensatory damages .
74
A sexually harassed claimant also faces difficulties if the claim is pursued
under a common law tort action. New Mexico does not recognize a tort
of sexual harassment.7 Hence, in the absence of a physical assault, a
sexually harassed employee wishing to pursue a common law claim is
trapped into the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, called
the law of outrage. 76 The requirements for obtaining relief under this
tort are extremely difficult. In Dominguez v. Stone, the court defined
the tort as follows: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress, ... .,17
Liability requires a finding that the distress "inflicted is so severe that
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."'7 8 Further, the tra-
ditional tort concept known as the "eggshell skull rule" does not apply,
unless the emotional distress "results from a peculiar susceptibility to
such distress of which the actor [offender] has knowledge. ' 79 Finally,
showing extreme and outrageous conduct by the offending employee is
a formidable standard to meet, since liability can only be found if "the
conduct ... [is] so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 'W Realizing
the difficulties presented, it is not surprising to find that sexually harassed
71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(A) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
72. Jaramillo v. J.C. Penney Co., 102 N.M. 272, 694 P.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1985). However, a
tort claim is not barred by an employee's failure to exhaust the grievance procedure. Phifer v.
Herbert, 115 N.M. 135, 138, 848 P.2d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 1993).
73. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-11(E) (Cum. Supp. 1993).
74. "Proper" in this context seems to mean the amount needed to compensate the victim for
medical treatment expenses and emotional distress.
75. See Phifer, 115 N.M. at 135, 848 P.2d at 5. Ohio has come closest to recognizing a tort
for sexual harassment when it recognized that an employer can be held liable for wilfully or
negligently allowing an employee to sexually molest a co-employee. Kerans v. Porter Paint Co.,
575 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ohio 1991).
76. Phifer, 115 N.M. at 139, 848 P.2d at 9.
77. 97 N.M. 211, 214, 638 P.2d 423, 426 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1965)).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j.
79. Id. cmt. j.
80. Id. cmt. d.
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employees are increasingly turning to other remedies which offer a more
viable possibility of relief.
A growing number of sexual harassment claims are being brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The federal courts have
recognized sexual harassment as a form of employment discrimination
under Title VII.82 In response to growing concerns that Title VII provided
only essentially equitable relief, the 1991 amendment to Title VII was
enacted "to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination
and unlawful harassment in the workplace." '83 This amendment provided
for the recovery of both compensatory and punitive damages, subject to
a cap on the total amount that could be recovered. 84
Despite allowing for recovery of damage awards, Title VII still presents
several significant legal obstacles to potential claimants. First, Title VII
requires that the respondent must have engaged in "unlawful intentional
discrimination."8 Hence, a claim based on an employer's negligence will
not suffice.8 6 Second, several circuits have adopted the Supreme Court
rule that a claim is not actionable unless it is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create[s
an abusive working environment.'"87 Third, under the 1991 amendment
a claimant cannot recover monetary damages if the respondent employs
fourteen or fewer employees. 8  Finally, these awards are available only
to those plaintiffs who do not have a cause of action under section 1981
of Title VII.89 Hence, the effect is that the caps imposed by the 1991
amendment arbitrarily limit the rights of women, disabled persons, and
members of certain religious groups2 ° Therefore, although it constitutes
a notable improvement in many ways over previous sexual harassment
remedies, the 1991 amendment still requires claimants to run through a
gauntlet of possible legal impediments.
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to -16 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
82. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also, e.g., Baker v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990); Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th
Cir. 1989); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. 11 1991) (purposes of 1991 amendment).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (Supp. III 1991).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. III 1991).
86. However, tolerance of a hostile work environment could constitute intent. See Meritor, 477U.S at 72 (rejecting view that "mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy againstdiscrimination ... must insulate [employer] from liability.").
87. Id. at 67; see, e.g., Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990) (adoptedMeritor standard of "sufficiently severe or pervasive"); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100(4th Cir. 1989) (same).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A) (Supp. III 1991).89. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). This section permits recovery of unlimited
compensatory and punitive damages only for intentional discrimination on grounds of race or
ethnicity. If a complaining party cannot recover on these grounds, then and only then can a claimantbring a cause of action pursuant to the 1991 amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (Supp. III 1991).Recall that the 1991 amendment, which covers employment discrimination based on sex, disability,
or religious beliefs, puts a cap on recoverable damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. III 1991).
90. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In deciding the question of whether sexual harassment injuries are
compensable under workers' compensation law, the court of appeals
refused to veer away from a traditional workers' compensation analysis,
which includes the dual requirements that an injury must arise out of
and in the course of employment. However, uneasy about applying the
traditional analysis to a sexual harassment claim, the court incorporated
the Meritor standard9l into determining whether the sexual harassment
arises out of the employment.
Despite their flaws, the non-workers' compensation remedies are ar-
guably better suited to providing relief to victims of sexual harassment
in New Mexico. The standards set forth in Cox appear to allow a
compensable sexual harassment claim under workers' compensation only
if sexual harassment is pervasive in the particular workplace and if the
employer either authorizes or permits the offensive behavior to continue
unchecked. In making a sexual harassment claim under workers' com-
pensation a substantially onerous legal action, Cox will certainly make
future sexual harassment plaintiffs wary of bringing workers' compen-
sation claims.
CARLOS M. QUIFONES
91. A Title VII claim for sexual harassment injuries is not compensable unless it is "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create[s] an abusive
working environment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
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